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A UNIFIED APPROACH TO CAUSATION IN DISPARATE 
TREATMENT CASES: USING SEXUAL HARASSMENT BY 
SUPERVISORS AS THE CAUSAL NEXUS FOR THE 
DISCRIMINATORY MOTIVATING FACTOR IN 
MIXED MOTIVES CASES 
MARGARET E. JOHNSON* 
This Comment examines a unified approach for disparate treatment mixed motives 
claims paired with sexual harassment claims under Title· Vii. The Author argues that · 
bee au~ of the poli~y for nondiscriminatory and desegregate~ . work environments 
embodied in Title VD, and because of the documented harm resulting from sexual 
harassment, courts should allow the burden of proof to shift to the defendant if the 
plaintiff demonstrates that her supervisor sexually harassed her, or condoned the 
harassment, and that the harassing sup·ervisor made an employment decision that was 
adverse to her. 
I. iNTRODUCTION 
In the wake of the· United States Supreme Court's decision in Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins1 and the recently enacted Civil Rights Act of 
1991,2 one important question remains concerning the Title Vll plaintiffs 
burden of proof in mixed motives disparate treatment cases: How close 
a causal nexus is required between the plaintiff employee's evidence of 
the defendant employer's discriminatory motive and the adverse 
* Class of 1993, University of Wisconsin Law School. I wish to thank 
Professors Carin Clauss and Vicki Schultz for their help. 
1. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). For discussions of Price Waterhouse see Paul J. Gudel, 
Beyond Causation: The Interpretation of Action and the Mixed Motives Problem in 
Employment Discrimination Law, 10 TEX. L. REV. 17, 52-68 (1991 ); Martha Chamallas, 
Listening to Dr. Fiske: The Easy Case ojPrice Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 15 VT. L. REV. 
89 (1990); William B. Gould, IV, The Supreme Court and Employment Discrimination 
Law in 1989: Judicial Retreat and Congressional Response, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1485, 1499-
1503 (1990); Charles A. Sullivan, Accounting for Price Waterhouse: Proving Disparate 
Treatment under Title VII, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 1107 (1991); Robert C. Johnson, 
Comment, Partnership and Title VII Remedies: Price Waterhouse Cracks the Glass 
Ceiling, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 787 (1991). 
2. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 [hereinafter 
Civil Rights Actl. 
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employment decision made against the plaintiff? This Comment will 
explore the recently resuscitated order of proof for sexual discrimination 
cases under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.3 The Supreme 
Court applied this framework to the mixed motives disparate treatment 
case brought by a female plaintiff in Price Waterhouse. The Civil Rights 
Act of 1991 modifies the standard of proof put forth by the plurality in 
Price Waterhouse. 
This Comment argues for a "unified approach" to sexual harassment 
cases and mixed motives disparate treatment cases that would invoke the 
burden shifting of Price Waterhouse and the Civil Rights Act of 1991.4 
Under the Unified Approach, in certain circumstances, the proven hostile 
environment sexual harassment by the plaintiffs supervisor constitutes 
proof of the illegitimate and discriminatory "motivating factor"6 
necessary in a mixed motives disparate treatment claim of sex 
discrimination. Once the plaintiff makes such a showing, the burden of 
persuasion shifts to the defendant employer to show that the same 
employment decision would have been made, even absent the 
impermissible motivating factor. At this point, whether or not the· 
defendant carries his burden, liability may attach. If the defendant is 
successful, however, damages will not be awarded.7 
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. [hereinafter Title VII]. Title VII states: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice. for an employer-(1) to fail or 
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his lor herl compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment ... lor tol limit, segregate, or 
classify his lor herl employment in any way which would deprive or tend to 
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely 
affect his [or herl status as an employee, because of such individual's race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1), (2) (1988). 
4. In this Comment the phrase "the modified Price Waterhouse burden shifting" 
refers to the Civil Rights Act of 1991's modification of the Price Waterhouse burden of 
proof. See infra notes 39-41 and accompanying text. 
5. Throughout this Comment, in regard to the Unified Approach, the requirement 
of proof by the plaintiff· of hostile work environment sexual harassment by the plaintifrs 
supervisor also may be satisfied by proof of hostile work environment harassment when 
the harassers are the plaintifrs coworkers, and the supervisor was aware of the 
harassment but did not act in any manner to stop it. 
6. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 107(a). This section amends§ 703 of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988), and states "(m) ... an unlawful 
employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that ... sex 
... was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also 
motivated the practice." 
. 7. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 107(b)(3)(B) states: 
On a claim in which an individual proves a violation under 703(m) [42 U .S.C. 
§ 2000e-2(m)l and a respondent demonstrates that the respondent would have 
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This Comment supports the Unified Approach by providing relevant 
research showing the connection between sexual harassment and women 
leaving the workforce. Because one of Title VII's goals is to eliminate 
sex segregation in the workforce, the Unified Approach profllotes the 
achievement of the overriding policy of the statute and provides a policy 
reason for having a broader definition of causation. 
Part II of this Comment examines the order of proof established by 
a line of cases decided prior to Price Waterhouse. These cases, dealing 
with pretext, operated on the assumption that the employment decision 
resulted from either a discriminatory purpose or a non-discriminatory 
purpose, but not a mixture of both. The purpose of this part is to explain 
the order of proof in this line of cases, thereby providing a comparison 
for the order of proof in Price Waterhouse. 
Part III discusses Price Waterhouse and the order of proof detailed 
by the plurality. This part also discusses Justice O'Connor's concurrence 
and Justice Kennedy's dissent, and the different approaches for proof that 
they propose. Finally, this part details the modifications of and changes 
to the Price Waterhouse decision resulting from the Civil Rights Act of 
1991. 
Part IV discusses sexual harassment law under Title VII. Part V 
details the link between sexual harassment and Title VII's policy. By 
documenting the harm to women caused by harassment and the effect of 
harassment on women's employment, this part suggests that to better 
serve Title VII's goals, the courts must account for harassment's role in 
the disparate treatment claims brought in conjunction with sexual 
harassment claims. 
Part VI details the Unified Approach and its definition of causation. 
This part looks more closely at the parameters of the causal nexus in 
mixed motives cases. Part VII applies the Unified Approach to specific 
factual situations in order to further demonstrate the Unified Approach's 
framework. · 
II. DISPARATE TREATMENT "PRETEXT" CASES 
Prior to the United States Supreme Court's 1989 Price Waterhouse 
decision, courts addressed disparate treatment sex discrimination claims 
primarily within the analytical framework utilized in two previous 
taken the same action in the absence of the impennissible motivating factor, 
the court- (i) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief (except as provided 
in clause (ii)), and attorney's fees and costs demonstrated to be directly 
attributable only to the pursuit of a claim under section 703(m); and (ii) shall 
not award damages or issue an order requiring any admission, reinstatement, 
hiring, promotion, or payment, described in subparagraph (A). · 
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Supreme Court Title VII discrimination cases: McDonnell Douglas Corp. 
v. Green8 and Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine. 9 In 
McDonnell Douglas, the complainant argued that he was subjected to 
racially discriminatory hiring practices. The Court held that the 
complainant must convince the trier of fact to infer a discriminatory 
purpose from the employer's behavior. 
Because the complainant used circumstantial, or indirect, evidence 
to support his allegations of racial discrimination, the Court stated that he 
could meet his burden of establishing a prima facie case by showing that 
(1) the complainant is a member of a protected group; (2) the complainant 
applied and was qualified for the job; (3) the complainant was rejected 
despite the complainant's qualifications; and (4) even after the 
complainant was rejected the employer continued to accept applications 
for the job from similarly qualified applicants. 10 
It is important to note that a prima facie case under McDonnell 
Douglas only raises an inference of discrimination. The prima facie case 
is used to rule out most of the possible nondiscriminatory explanations for 
the adverse employment action, and therefore, the courts presume that the 
acts, unless shown to be otherwise, are more likely than not the result of 
discrimination. 11 Once the plaintiff meets this initial burden of proof by 
showing a prima facie case, the burden "shifts" to the defendant employer 
to show a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the activity in 
question. 12 Then, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff, providing her 
with an opportunity to show that the defendant's "legitimate" reason is 
merely a pretext for the true, discriminatory reason. 13 In other words, 
this order of proof prevents the employer from using a false legitimate 
reason as a smoke screen for the underlying discriminatory reason. 
In Burdine, the Court expanded upon the McDonnell Douglas 
framework. The respondent filed suit against her employer claiming that 
she was subjected to sex discrimination in violation of Title VII when she 
8. 411 u.s. 792 (1973). 
9. 450 u.s. 248 (1981). 
10. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. It should be noted the Court stated that 
when the facts change in other Title VII cases, the four factors necessary for a prima facie 
case should also change in light of the different facts. -ld. at n.13. For example, in a sex 
discrimination claim of disparate treatment in promotion, the elements of a prima facie 
case would be that: (1) the complainant. is a member of a protected group; (2) the 
complainant was qualified and eligible for the promotion; (3) the complainant was not 
promoted despite her qualifications; and (4) after the complainant was not promoted, a 
man received the promotion. 
11. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 1115 (quoting Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 
u.s. 567, 577 (1978)). 
12. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. 
13. ld. at 804. 
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was terminated from her job.14 The Court, following McDonnell 
Douglas, held that once the plaintiff proves a prima facie case of 
discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence, the burden shifts to 
the defendant to articulate a legitimate reason for the employee's 
termination. The employer does not need to show that he was actually 
motivated by the nondiscriminatory reason. Finally, if the defendant 
provides a legitimate reason, overcoming the presumption of 
discrimination, the plaintiff must show, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that the defendant's reason was a pretext for discrimination." 
The Burdine Court clarified that the defendant, in order to rebut the 
presumption of discrimination, needs to create only a genuine issue of fact 
as to whether the defendant discriminated against the plaintiff.16 
Therefore, the ultimate burden placed upon the plaintiff to persuade the 
Court that the employer discriminated against her is not altered by the 
"burden shift" to the defendant The defendant carries only a burden of 
production, and not a burden of persuasion. 
Later Supreme Court . cases helped clarify the McDonnell 
Douglas/Burdine standard of proof. · In Trans World Airlines v. 
Thurston, 11 the Supreme Court stated 'that the McDonnell Douglas 
framework does not apply to situations where the plaintiff has produced 
direct evidence of discrimination.18 The Court further explained that the 
McDonnell Douglas framework promotes a policy of allowing plaintiffs, 
whose claims consist only of circumstantial evidence, to have their day in 
court. 19 As in Thurston, however, if a plaintiff offers direct evidence of 
14. In this case, the Texas Department of Community Affairs initially hired the 
respondent for the position of accounting clerk and later promoted her to Field Service 
Coordinator. Although she applied for a supervisor position, she was not hired for it, and 
the position remained open until a male was hired for the position. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 
250. The male supervisor fired the respondent. She was soon rehired in a position 
comparable to that of supervisor, but in another department. The respondent filed suit, 
alleging that the decision to not promote her and then to fire her constituted gender 
discrimination in violation of Title VII. ld. at 251. 
15. ld. at 252-53. 
16. ld. at 254. 
17. 469 U.S. 111 (1985). In Thurston, the plaintiffs claimed that they were 
discriminated against on the basis of age. They brought suit under the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act (ADEA) stating that TWA's transfer policy violated the Act because 
the policy did not provide the same employment privileges for employees who were forced 
to retire at age 60 as it did for employees who were displaced for reasons other than age. 
ld. at 118. The TWA policy constituted "direct evidence" of age discrimination. In this 
case, the label of direct evidence was assigned easily because the policy was not facially 
neutral. ld. at 121. 
18. ld. at 121. 
19. ld. See also Radomsky v. United States, 180 F.2d 781, 783 (9th Cir. 
1950)(stating that "(d)irect evidence establishes facts to be proved without the necessity 
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discrimination, the prima facie case of discrimination is not necessary and 
the McDonnell Douglas framework is inapplicable. 
The order of proof in pretext disparate treatment cases requires the 
plaintiff to carry the burden of proof throughout the entire case. Under 
the McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff makes a prima facie case 
using circumstantial evidence. Then the burden of production shifts to the 
defendant to articulate a legitimate reason for the treatment. If the 
plaintiff can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
defendant's reason is pretextual, then the plaintiff has proven that the 
defendant has violated Title VII. If the plaintiff is unable to prove 
pretext, however, then the defendant escapes liability. 
III. PRICE WATERHOUSE 
The Supreme Court applied a different standard of proof in Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins.'JD In Price Waterhouse, Ann Hopkins, an 
accountant, was denied a promotion to partnership in a large accounting 
firm. She brought a sex discrimination claim under Title VII, stating that 
her employer denied her promotion because of her gender. Hopkins 
supported her claim with evidence of boardroom comments concerning 
her recommendation for partnership. The comments included references 
to her poor interpersonal skills, as well as negative reactioqs to Hopkins' 
lack of stereotypically female personality traits. 21 Because both 
legitimate and illegitimate motivations existed, the case was labeled a 
"mixed motives" case. 
for ... inference[s)" that are required by circumstantial evidence). 
20. 490 u.s. 228 (1989). 
21. The comments included such praise as "an outstanding professional," 
possessing "strong character," and a "stimulating conversationalist." The comments also 
referred to her as abrasive, harsh, and impatient. The comments that led the plurality to 
believe that some of the partners' evaluations were negative because she was a woman 
included those that described her as "macho," objected to her use of profanity "because 
it's a lady using foul language," and maintained that she "ha[d) matured from a 
tough-talking somewhat masculine hard-nosed mgr [sic) to an authoritative, formidable, 
but much more appealing lady ptr [sic] candidate." The most dramatic comment came 
from the partner who porsonally advised Hopkins, upon announcing to her that she had 
been put on hold for partnership, that her chances would improve if she would "walk 
more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her 
hair styled, and wear jewelry." Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 234-35. 
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A. The Plurality Decision 
A plurality. of the Court remanded the case to the court of appeals to 
apply the appropriate standard: When a plaintiff establishes that the 
employer's motivation for its activity was discriminatory, the plaintiff has 
carried her burden of proof. Once gender is proven to be a factor in the 
employment decision, the employer can avoid liability only by showing, 
by a preponderance of the evidence, that absent the illegitimate 
gender-based motivation, the employment decision would have been the 
same.22 
The Court explained that because the plaintiff in a mixed motives 
case cannot separate out the true reason for the adverse employment 
decision, primarily because she cannot access the defendant's thoughts, 
the Burdine standard of proof framework is inapplicable. 23 The Burdine 
framework is appropriate for cases in which the only reason for the 
adverse employment decision was an illegitimate one. ln a mixed motives 
case24 such as Price Waterhouse, there is more than one reason, and the 
motives are usually a combination of illegitimate and legitimate reasons 
for the employer's actions. The Price Waterhouse plurality held that in a 
mixed motives case, the plaintiff must carry the ultimate burd~n of proof 
as to the gender issue, but the employer must carry a burden as to the 
non-gender issues. :zs 
The question to be determined through these different burdens is 
whether gender, at the moment the employment decision was made, was 
a motivating factor. 26 In saying "gender played a motivating role," the 
plurality meant that "if [they] asked the employer at the moment of the 
decision what its reasons were and if [they] received a truthful response, 
one of those reasons [for the employment decision] would be that the 
applicant or employee was a woman. "27 
22. Id. at 258. 
23. Id. at 245-47. 
24. Id. at 247 n.12. The Court stated that to establish a mixed motives case the 
plaintiff must "satisfy the factfmder that it is more likely than not that a forbidden 
characteristic played a part in the employment decision .... " If the plaintiff fails to 
prove this, "then she may prevail only if she proves, following Burdine, that the 
employer's stated reason for its decision is pretcxtual." Id. 
25. Id. at 246 n.ll. The employer's burden is in the form of an "affirmative 
defense." Id. at 246. The Court further stated that "where an employer is unable to 
prove its claim that it would have made the same decision in the absence of 
discrimination, [the Court is! entitled to conclude that gender did make a difference to 
the outcome." Id. at 246 n.ll. 
26. Id. at 241. 
27. Id. at 250 (footnote omitted). The plurality stated that they do not believe this 
defmition to be hypothetical. Id. at 250 n.13. 
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The plurality stated that once the plaintiff has shown that gender was 
a motivating factor, Title VII allows the employer to present an 
affirmative defense. In other words, if the employer wishes to escape 
liability, the employer must persuade the court that even absent gender, 
the result would have been the same. The Court explicitly maintained 
that this so called "affirmative defense" is not a shifting of the burden of 
proof in regard to the gender issue. 
The plurality explained that its decision to shift the burden of 
persuasion to the defendant was compelled by the plurality's interpretation 
that Title VII forbids any consideration of gender in an employment 
decision. 28 The Court permitted employers to avoid liability by offering 
an affirmative defense because of "[t]he other important aspect of the 
statute: [the] preservation of an employer's remaining freedom of 
choice. "29 
The plurality found that the evidence provided by Hopkins showed 
the existence of the mixed motives. Hopkins proved that some of the 
comments written about her in the partnership decision-making process 
were based on sex-based stereotypes.30 She also proved that part of the 
decision not to promote her was based on those comments, and that Price 
Waterhouse never disclaimed that the decision did rely on the gender 
stereotype.31 The Court stated that proof of sex-based stereotypes can 
constitute proof of an illegitimate motive and thereby prove that gender 
was actually a motivating factor in the employment decision. The 
plurality found that Hopkins had proven illegitimate motives by specific 
evidence, but the plurality refrained from deciding what specific facts 
.would or would not meet the threshold of establishing a plaintiffs case 
in other cases. 32 
28. Gudel, supra note 1, at 60. 
29. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 242 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion). 
Congress, in enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1991, changed this part of the decision. 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 107(a),(b)(3)(B). Liability now attaches after the plaintiff has 
shown that gender was a diseriminatory motivating factor in the employment decision. 
The employer, in stating that the same decision would have been made even absent the 
discriminatory motive, is not stating an affirmative defense. Instead, this stage allows the 
defendant to avoid "make whole" remedies, such as back pay. The change in this 
decision is rooted in Title VII, § 706(g), which permits a court to award affirmative relief 
when it fmds that an employer "has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging 
in an unlawful employment praetice," and yet forbids a court to order reinstatement of, 
or backpay to, "an individual ... if sueh an individual was refused ... employment or 
advancement or was suspended or diseharged for any reason, other than discrimination 
on the basis of ... sex." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 5(g). 
30. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235. 
31. ld. at 251. 
32. ld. at 251-52. Because Title VII prohibits employment discrimination 
"because of" sex, many courts have debated about what "because of' means. Here, the 
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B. Justice O'Connor's Concurrence 
On the facts of this case, Justice O'Connor agreed with the plurality 
that the burden of persuasion should shift to the employer to demonstrate 
by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same 
decision even absent the discriminatory motive.33 Justice O'Connor did 
notjoin the plurality's opinion, however, because she disagreed with the 
plurality as to when, in future cases, the burden should shift to the 
defendant. 
Justice O'Connor's concurrence distinguished cases such as 
McDonnell Douglas, in which the plaintiff has presented no direct 
evidence toward proving that the employer based its decision on the 
plaintiff's sex, from cases such as Price Waterhouse, in which the 
plaintiff offers direct evidence. 34 Because of this distinction, Justice 
O'Connor maintained that the issue of causation should only be shifted if 
the plaintiff has produced direct evidence that her sex was a substantial 
factor in the employment decision. 35 Without direct evidence, she 
stated, there was no justification for shifting the burden of persuasion. 
Consequently, Justice O'Connor would not allow stray remarks in the 
workplace, statements by nondecision-makers, or statements by decision 
makers "unrelated to" the employment decisional process to satisfy the 
plaintiff's burden. 36 
Justice O'Connor disagreed primarily with the plurality's holding that 
once the plaintiff had. produced evidence showing gender was a 
"motivating factor," the burden of persuasion shifted to the defendant to 
Court stated that stray stereotyping remarks in the workplace would not be enough to 
prove that gender played a part in the adverse employment decision. The Court stated that 
"[t]he plaintiff must show that the employer actually relied on her gender in making its 
decision." ld. at 251. The Court further stated that "we refrain from deciding here 
which specific facts, 'standing alone,' would or would not establish a plaintiffs case, 
since such a decision is unnecessary in this case." ld. at 252. The Unified Approach, 
laid out in Part VII of this Comment, would allow evidence of sexual harassment, in some 
instances, to operate as specific proof for establishing a plaintiffs mixed motives disparate 
treatment claim. 
33. ld. at 261 (O'Connor, J ., concurring). Justice O'Connor referred to the area 
of tort liability to show that in certain civil cases, such as those tort cases involving 
multiple causation, the burden has shifted to the defendant because it would be unfair and 
not in the interest of the deterrent policy of tort law to have the plaintiff prove "but for" 
causation. Therefore, torta shifts the burden to the defendants to prove that their negligent 
acts were not the but for causation. ld. at 263-64. 
34. ld. at 270. See supra text accompanying note 18. 
35. ld. at 276. 
36. Id. at 277. 
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offer an affirmative defense. Justice O'Connor maintained that the 
plaintiff must make an initial showing of "direct evidence" of causation. 
Justice O'Connor stated that the plurality had confused the causation 
requirement set out in Title VII-the "because of" -for the affirmative 
' . 
defense requirement. Justice O'Connor disagreed that once there was 
some evidence that an employment decision was "tainted" by the 
plaintiff's sex, the burden should shift to the employer to show that, 
absent the awareness of the plaintiff's sex, the decision would hav~ been 
the same.37 
C. The Dissenting Opinion 
The dissent, authored by Justice Kennedy, argued that the mixed 
motives cases should have the same order of proof as the other disparate 
treatment cases. In other words, mixed motives cases should follow the 
Burdine order of proof. The dissent maintained that Title VII does not 
mandate the creation of a new order of proof for mixed motives cases. 
Therefore, Justice Kennedy argued that the Burdine framework, which 
clearly leaves on the plaintiff the ultimate burden of ·persuasion 
concerning whether or not the defendant intentionally discriminated 
against the plaintiff, should be the order of proof for mixed motives cases 
as well. 38 
D. Modifications of Price Waterhouse by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 clarified and changed the ruling of the 
Price Waterhouse plurality in two ways. First, the Act clarifies that the 
burden shifts to the defendant once the plaintiff has established that sex 
was a "motivating" factor for any employment practice. 39 Although the 
Price Waterhouse plurality discusses a "motivating reason," the opinion 
also suggests that the plaintiff only has to show that gender was "a factor 
in the employment decision at the moment it was made. "40 
The second element of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 related to mixed 
motives cases actually changes the Price Waterhouse decision. Under the 
Price Waterhouse plurality decision, liability does not attach if the 
defendant proves an affirmative defense-that the same employment 
decision would have been made even absent the illegitimate, 
discriminatory motive. 
37. ld. at 277-78. 
38. ld. at 290 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
39. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 107(a), (b)(3)(B). 
40. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion). 
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Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, however, liability attaches after 
the plaintiff has shown that gender was a discriminatory motivating factor 
in the employment decision. At this point, the court may grant 
declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and attorney's fees. The employer, 
in stating that the same decision would have been made even absent the 
discriminatory motive, is not stating an affirmative defense. Instead, this 
stage allows the defendant to avoid a ruling awarding "make whole" 
remedies, such as damages or back pay.41 The Act's modification of 
Price Waterhouse is more generous to the plaintiff because it does not 
allow the defendant to escape liability if he relied upon gender in his 
employment decision. 
Therefore, under the modified Price Waterhouse burden shifting 
standard, when a plaintiff establishes that part of the employer's 
motivation for its activity was discriminatory, she has carried her burden 
of proof and liability attaches. Once gender is proven to be a factor in 
the employment decision, the employer may avoid the payment of 
damages and make whole remedies by showing by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the employment decision would have been the same even 
absent the illegitimate motivation of gender. 
In order to trigger the modified burden shifting standard for mixed 
motives disparate treatment claims, the plaintiff must show that gender 
was a motivating factor in the employment decision. This Comment next 
examines sexual harassment and· its relationship to disparate treatment 
claims in order to advocate the Unified Approach, which uses proof of 
sexual harassment as evidence that gender was a motivating factor. 
IV. SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 
Sexual harassment, because it is sex discrimination, presents a cause 
of action under Title VII.42 . The Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission's "Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex"43 define 
sexual harassment as unwelcome "verbal or physical conduct of a sexual 
nature" unreasonably interfering with an employee's work or creating an 
"intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment. "44 If the 
sexual harassment interferes with the individual's ability to work or 
creates a hostile working environment, then the sexual harassment is 
41. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 107(b)(3)(B). 
42. See E.E.O.C. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 
1604.11(a) (1985) [hereinafter E.E.O.C. Guidelines]. The E.E.O.C. Guidelines state that 
"[h]arassment on the basis of sex is a violation of Sec. 703 of Title VII." /d. 
43. /d. 
44. /d. See also,· Comment, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work 
Environment under Title VII, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1449, 1453 (1984). 
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actionable under Title VII.45 Sexual harassment is actionable even if it 
is not causally related to an economic detriment. 46 
Title VII provides for two kinds of sexual harassment claims. The 
first, "quid pro quo" sexual harassment, involves the requirement of the 
woman's sexual compliance in exchange for an employment or economic 
benefit, such as being hired, promoted, or not fired. 47 In a quid pro quo 
claim, the woman alleges that a term of her employment is being 
threatened because of her gender. 48 The second type of sexual 
harassment is "hostile work environment. "49 This category involves 
"the persistent subjection of female employees to an intimidating, hostile, 
or offensive working environment."~ 
The Eleventh Circuit, in Henson v. City of Dundee, outlined five 
elements of a sexual harassment claim: A plaintiff must prove that (I) the 
employee belongs to a protected group; (2) the employee was subjected 
to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) the sexual harassment was based 
upon her sex; (4) the sexual harassment affected a term, condition, or 
privilege of her employment; and (5) the employer is liable under 
respondeat superior theory. 51 The fourth factor must be tested both 
objectively and subjectively. For the claim to be actionable, the sexual 
harassment must be "sufficiently pervasive so as to alter the conditions of 
employment and create an abusive working environment. " 52 Courts 
recognize hostile work environment sexual harassment as affecting a 
"term" of employment that is protected under Title VII: the work 
environment.53 In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson the United States 
Supreme Court adopted the Henson test for sexual harassment. 54 
Prior to Meritor, lower courts did not recognize hostile work 
environment sexual harassment as a cause of action under Title VII if the 
45. E.E.O.C. Guidelines, supra note 42. 
46. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (citing E.E.O.C. 
Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.ll(a)(3) (1983)). 
47. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OP WORKING WOMEN 
32 (1979). See aLso Chamberlin v. 101 Realty, Inc., 915 F.2d 777 (1st Cir. 1990); Steele 
v. Offshore Shipbuilding, 867 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1989); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 
983 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
48. Joshua F. Thorpe, Gender-Based Harassment and the Hostile Work 
Environment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1361. 
49. See Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983); Henson v. City of Dundee, 
682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
50. Comment, supra note 44, at 1455. 
51. Henson, 682 F.2d at 903-05. This five element test is a modification of the 
Burdine prima facie case for showing disparate treatment. 
52. Id. at 904. 
53. Thorpe, supra note 48, at 1361. 
54. 477 u.s. 57 (1986). 
1993:231 Causation in Disparate Treatment Cases 243 
harassment did not result in any economic ~njury to the victim. In 
Meritor, the Supreme Court clarified that Title VII prohibits "arbitrary 
barriers to sexual equality at the workplace" created by a hostile or 
offensive environment through sexual harassment. 55 
The five-part test proving sexual harassment requires a plaintiff to 
offer very substantial evidence of the harassment. In a claim based on 
quid pro quo sexual harassment, the plaintiff has to prove that she was 
denied an employment benefit because of her refusal to comply with her 
supervisor's sexual advances. In a claim alleging hostile work 
environment sexual harassment, the plaintiff must prove that the 
harassment was severe and pervasive. As stated in Meritor, "not all 
workplace conduct that may be described as 'harassment' affects a 'term, 
condition, or privilege' of employment within the meaning of Title 
VII. "56 To demonstrate the threshold for "severe and pervasive," the 
Court explained that one offending remark related to the victim's gender 
would not be sufficiently "severe and pervasive" to affect employment 
conditions, and therefore would not violate Title VII. Additionally, the 
successful plaintiff must show that the harassment intimidated and 
offended her. 
V. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND THE 
OBJECTIVES OF TITLE VII 
Congress, by enacting Title VII, intended to promote workplace 
integration across gender lines and to protect women from discrimination 
in the workplace.57 Although as originally introduced in Congress the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not include sex as a protected class, sex was 
included shortly before passage. 58 Sexual harassment is documented as 
more pervasive when women enter into male-dominated and partially 
55. ld. at 67 (citing Henson, 682 F.2d at 902). 
56. ld. 
57. See Rogers v. E.E.O.C., 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971) ("One can 
readily envision working environments so heavily polluted with discrimination as to 
destroy completely the emotional and psychological stability of minority group workers, 
and I think Section 703 of Title VII was aimed at the eradication of such noxious 
practices."). 
58. Sex was originally included in an attempt to defeat the bill. CHARLES 
WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 
1964 CIVIL RIGHTS Acr 115-17 (1985). Regardless of the haphazard manner by which 
the class entered Title VII, courts have treated the inclusion of prohibiting discrimination 
based on sex as equal to the inclusion of prohibiting discrimination based on race, national 
origin, or religion. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 243-44 n.9. 
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sex-segregated types of employment. 59 Consequently, for the policy 
goals of Title VII to be realized, courts must recognize the link between 
sexual harassment, sex segregation in the workplace, and employment 
decisions based on an employee's gender. 
The harm suffered by victims of sexual harassment has been well 
documented. Most sexual harassment claims involve the harassment of 
a female employee by a male supervisor or coworker. 60 A common 
experience is that the pers!stent exposure to harassment causes a decrease 
in the woman's ambition, motivation, job performance, and job 
attendance. 61 As one victim stated "I . . . looked forward to being laid 
·off-it was such a relief from the barrage of psychological and physical 
warfare targeted at me personally and at women in general. "62 Many 
women may choose to leave a job rather than continue to endure the 
harassment. 63 
When women have experienced sexual harassment, they very rarely 
have brought a Title VII action because, historically, the law offered little 
relief. Until the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 , women could 
obtain only injunctive relief or affirmative relief such as the posting of 
sexual harassment complaint procedures for a successful harassment 
claim.64 Women thus often waited to bring suit until a detrimental 
employment result occurred, such as being fired, not promoted, or 
demoted. Other women waited to bring suit until the harassment was so 
severe that the woman had no choice but to leave. 65 Therefore, sexual 
59. Susan E. Martin, Sexual Harassment: 1heLinkJoining Gender Stratification, 
Sexuality, and Women's Economic Status, in WOMEN: A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE 57, 61 
(Jo Freeman ed., 4th ed. 1989) (citing the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board that w55 
percent of those [women} who worked in virtually all-male groups and 49 percent of those 
in predominantly male groups were subjected to harassment .... "); Vicki Schultz, 
Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in The 
Workplace in Tille VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REv. 
1749, 1833-34 (citing Gutek & Morasch, Sex Ratios, Sex-Role Spillover, and Sexual 
Harassment of Women at Work, J. Soc. Issues, Winter 1982, at 67-68; Martin, supra). 
60. David J. Burge, Note, Employment Discrimination-Defining an Employer's 
Liability under Title VII for: On-The-Job Sexual Harassment: Adoption of a Bifurcated 
Standard, 62 N.C. L. REV. 795 (1984). 
61. Martin, supra note 59, at 62; Wendy Pollack, Sexual Harassment: Women's 
Experience vs. Legal Definitions, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 35, 51 (1990). 
62. Pollack, supra note 61, at 37. 
63. Christine Merriman & Cora Yang, Note, Employer Liability for Coworker 
Sexual Harassment under Title VII, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 83, 84-85 
(1984-1985). 
64. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706(g). Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 1977A 
allows for compensatory and punitive damages. 
65. This is known as wconstructive discharge." 
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harassment suits usually were paired with a disparate treatment claim or 
a constructive discharge claim. 
Even with the pairing of sexual harassment and disparate treatment 
claims, the courts have employed a bifurcated approach to the two 
claims.66 When courts have analyzed the claims separately, they have 
tended to divide the plaintiffs proof among the various claims. Rather 
than determining the relevancy of all the plaintiffs evidence to the various 
claims, the courts have used the sexual harassment evidence only as · 
evidence for the hostile environment claim and have not also considered 
it as proof of the disparate treatment claim. Consequently, the plaintiffs 
proof for the disparate treatment claim appears less strong than it actually 
is. 
Because of the correlation between sexual harassment and the reality 
ofwomen leaving nontraditional jobs, whether they be blue collar trades, 
male-dominated professions, or other' jobs not typically held by 
women, 67 the connection between sexual harassment and disparate 
treatment must be addressed in the courts' analytical frameworks and by 
the standards of proof applied. As discussed further in the following 
Part, the Unified Approach allows plaintiffs to use the proof of hostile 
environment sexual harassment when proving their disparate treatment 
claim. Under the Unified Approach, a judicial finding of sexual 
harassment by the superviso~ constitutes proof that sex was a 
motivating factor in the adverse employment decision made by the 
supervisor against the plaintiff. Therefore, when the supervisor claims 
that the employment decision was based on a legitimate motive, such as 
the plaintiffs poor interpersonal skills, the disparate treatment claim 
66. The courts even divide their opinions and analysis under separate headings of 
"sexual harassment" and "disparate treatment." See Danna v. New York Telephone Co., 
752 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). Additionally, many of the courts do not consider 
the evidence of sexual harassment as evidence also of the disparate treatment. See 
Ramsey v. City and County of Denver, 907 F.2d 1004 (lOth Cir. 1990). 
67. Schultz, supra note 59, at 1834 (citing BARBARA GtiTF.K, SEX AND THE 
WORKPLACE 119 (1985); MOLLY MARTIN, HARD-HATrED WOMEN: STORIES OF 
STRUOOLEAND SUCCESS IN THE TRADES 11 (1988); Eisenberg, Women Hard Hats Speak 
Out, NATION, Sept. 18, 1989, at 272-73; Pollack, supra note 61, at 37-38; Carrie 
Mcnkel-Meadow, Exploring a Research Agenda on the Feminization of the Legal 
Profession: Theories of Gender and Social Change, 14 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 289, 307 
(1989); LindaLiefland, Career Patterns of Male and Female Lawyers, 35 BUFF. L. REv. 
601, 609-11 (1986)). See also Martin, supra note 59, at 61 (citing the U.S. Merit 
Systems Protection Board that "the proportions of women in professional and technical, 
clerical, and blue-collar positions that reported victimization were 41, 40, and 38 percent 
respectively .... "). ' 
68. See supra note 5. 
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becomes one of mixed motives, and should be analyzed under the 
modified Price Waterhouse framework. 
VI. THE UNIFIED APPROACH: WHAT CONSTITUTES CAUSATION 
The Unified Approach aims to create a new analytical framework for 
Title VII plaintiffs to show courts that an adverse employment decision 
was "because of' their sex. The Supreme Court's announcement, in 
Price Waterhouse, that the burden of persuasion would shift to the 
defendant was what made that case a landmark decision. · Even with the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, the burden shifting remains. The Act, 
however, has modified the decision in order to allow liability to attach 
after the plaintiff's proof that gender was a motivating factor in the 
adverse employment decision.~ The modification by the Act, in fact, 
will help to deter consideration of forbidden criteria in the decisional 
process.10 
As explained previously, the Unified Approach would be used by 
plaintiffs who pair a hostile environment claim with a disparate treatment 
mixed motives claim. The Unified Approach would operate under the 
modified Price Waterhouse burden shifting order of proof. Under the 
Unified Approach, to show that gender was a motivating factor in an 
adverse employment decision, the plaintiff would need to make a 
three-step showing, including proof of (1) hostile environment harassment 
by the plaintiff's supervisor toward the plaintiff,71 (2) an ·adverse 
employment decision made against the plaintiff by the supervisor, and (3) 
the supervisor's involvement in both (1) and (2). Upon this three-step 
showing by the plaintiff, liability attaches because the plaintiff would have 
shown that the supervisor was motivated, at least in part, by the 
employee's gender when making the employment decision. The plaintiff 
would show that because the supervisor relied on her gender previously 
in order to harass her, he is again relying on her. gender to make this 
employment decision. Then, the court would shift the burden of 
persuasion to the defendant to show by a preponderance of the evidence 
that absent the illegitimate motive, the result would have been the same. 
69. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text. 
70. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 265 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice 
O'Connor states that "lt)here is no doubt that Congress considered reliance on gender or 
race in making employment decisions an evil in itself . . . . Reliance on such factors is 
exactly what the threat of Title VII liability was· meant to deter . . . . Congress was 
certainly not blind to the stigmatie harm which comes from being evaluated by a process 
which treats one as an inferior by reasori of one's ... sex." ld. 
71. See supra note 5. 
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If the defendant were unable to successfully meet his burden, the court 
would award damages and make whole relief to the plaintiff. 
In order to explain the Unified Approach, this part is divided into 
four sections. The first three sections focus on different aspects that the 
Price Waterhouse decision, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and other 
federal courts have decided are necessary in a disparate treatment claim 
in order to employ the burden shifting of the modified Price Waterhouse 
case. The various aspects are mixed motives, proof of gender as the 
"motivating factor" in the employment decision, and "direct evidence" of 
the motivating factor. The last section explains how the Unified 
Approach would allow the courts to help Title Vll more comprehensively 
achieve its mandate. 
A. Mixed Motives 
As seen in the earlier discussion of the Price Waterhouse 
framework, n both illegitimate and legitimate motives must be involved 
in the alleged disparate treatment in order to invoke the modified Price 
Waterhouse burden shifting. The Unified Approach is applicable to 
mixed motives cases. Under the Unified Approach, once the plaintiff has 
proven the sexual harassment by the same supervisor who made the 
employment decision against her, she has proven that sex was a 
motivating factor in her disparate treatment. The employer claims, 
however, that he made the employment decision because of legitimate 
motives, such as the plaintiffs poor interpersonal skills. Because of the 
proof of illegitimate motives and the claim of legitimate motives, this case 
is a "mixed motives" case. · 
B. Gender as the Motivating Factor: Proving Causation 
The Unified Approach offers one way for Title VII plaintiffs to 
demonstrate that gender was a "motivating factor" in the employment 
decision. In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court held that upon the 
plaintiffs demonstration that gender was a motivating factor in the 
employment decision, the burden shifts to the employer to show that even 
absent the discriminatory motivation, the employment decision would 
have been the same.73 But no court or statute has stated explicitly the 
degree of proximity required for the causal nexus between the 
employment decision and the gender discrimination in order to satisfy the 
plaintiffs burden of proof that "gender was a motivating factor in the 
72. See supra notes 20-38 and accompanying text. 
73. See supra notes 22-32 and accompanying text. 
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employment decision." Under the Unified Approach, proof of sexual 
harassment proves that gender was a "motivating factor" in the 
employment decision and triggers application of the modified Price 
Waterhouse order of proof. 
In Price Waterhouse, the plurality offered hints as to what would or 
would not satisfy the plaintiffs initial burden of persuasion to prove that 
gender was a "motivating factor." First, the plurality stated that 
"motivating factor" meant the true reason at the moment of the adverse 
decision that the employer would offer, if asked, for the adverse 
employment decision. 74 This standard is not helpful because it would be 
rare indeed for an employer to express that his reason for acting was 
discriminatory and illegal. Also, the plaintiff rarely will have access to 
this information, and therefore it does not aid the plaintiff in presenting 
proof that gender was a motivating factor. 
The plurality's finding in Price Waterhouse that gender was a 
motivating factor provides guidance to future plaintiffs that evidence of 
the kind offered by Ann Hopkins was enough. But, again, it will be the 
rare case in which an employee's evidence consists of comments, written 
during the employment decision-making process, denying her promotion 
because of her inability to fit the "female stereotype." Therefore, the 
Price Waterhouse plurality opinion does not provide any clear guidance 
to future plaintiffs as to the threshold requirements for shifting the burden 
to the defendant. 
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 has not helped to clarify the ambiguity 
surrounding how to prove that gender was a motivating factor in the 
employment decision. The Act states that "an unlawful employment 
practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates 
that . . . sex . . . was a motivating factor for any employment practice, 
even though other factors also motivated the practice. "75 The Act does 
not specify by what type of evidence the plaintiff must show that gender 
was a "motivating factor." Therefore, neither Price Waterhouse nor the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991 aid Title VII litigants in understanding the 
plaintiffs necessary proof for a mixed motives case. 
The Unified Approach helps give definition to "motivating factor." 
The Unified Approachwould operate in common law suits in which Title 
VII plaintiffs have paired a sexual harassment claim. with a disparate 
treatment claim. Under the Unified Approach, the proven hostile work 
environment sexual harassment by a supervisor76 is a "motivating factor" 
for an adverse employment decision by the same supervisor, and invokes 
74. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241.(Brennan, J., plurality opinion). 
75. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 107. 
76. See supra note 5. 
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the Price Waterhouse burden shifting. The Unified Approach suggests 
that the sexual harassment, found by the court to have been motivated by 
the plaintiffs sex,77 is evidence that gender is also a "motivating factor" 
in the adverse employment action taken by the same supervisor.78 
For example, the Unified Approach would trigger a burden shifting 
in a mixed motives case in which a plaintiff brings both a sexual 
harassment and a disparate treatment claim of failure to promote. First, 
the plaintiff would be required to prove successfully, under the Henson 
five-part test, that she was subjected to hostile work environment sexual 
harassment by her supervisor. Second, the plaintiff would be required to 
show that she was not promoted and that the supervisor who harassed her 
was involved in the decision to not promote her. Third, the plaintiff 
would be required to show that gender was a motivating factor in the 
decision not to promote her because, as evident from the sexual 
harassment, her supervisor previously had acted discriminatorily against 
her. Thus, the plaintiffs claim would be that the proven sexual 
harassment constitutes discriminatory treatment and evidence of an 
illegitimate motive for not promoting her and shows that the promotional 
decision was truly based on the employee~s gender. The supervisor, 
however, would argue that the plaintiff was fired because she has a 
difficult personality and weak interpersonal skills. This· is a mixed 
motives case. 
Under the Unified Approach, the proof that the harassing 
supervisor79 was responsible for the employment decision provides the 
77. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982). Part three of 
the Henson five-part test for proof of hostile work environment sexual harassment requires 
that the plaintiff show that the sexual harassment was based upon her sex. 
78. The distinction between the Unified Approach and a quid pro quo analysis is 
that in quid pro quo sexual harassment, the adverse employment action is in response to 
the woman deelininga sexual advance or request for sexual favors. E.E.O.C. Guidelines 
stated: 
Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of Sec. 703 of Title VII. 
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or 
physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute harassment when (1) submission 
to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of 
an individual's employment, or (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct 
by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such 
an individual . . . . 
The Unified Approaeh, on the other hand, allows a plaintiff, once she has proven hostile 
work environment sexual harassment by a supervisor, to use that determination as 
evidence of the "motivating factor" for the same supervisor's adverse employment aetion 
against her. Thus, under the Unified Approach, the employment action is not assumed 
to have resulted from the woman's response to the sexual harassment, as is the case in 
quid pro quo sexual harassment. 
79. See supra note 5. 
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adequate causal nexus for the burden to shift. Hostile work environment 
sexual harassment committed by the supervisor, having been found by the 
court to be "sufficiently severe and pervasive to alter the conditions of 
[the plaintiffs] employment and create an abusive working 
environment, "IKI would satisfy the threshold standard of causation for 
showing that gender was a motivating factor in the decision not to 
promote the plaintiff. 81 
In the above example, upon the plaintiffs three-step showing, 
liability would attach and the burden of persuasion would shift to the 
defendant. As in all mixed motives cases, the burden shifting makes it 
the defendant's responsibility to prove that the legitimate reasons by 
themselves were enough to cause the employment decision. Thus, in 
order to escape the payment of damages and make whole remedies, the 
defendant would .be required to show that even absent the illegitimate 
motivation, the plaintiff would not have been promoted because of her 
weak interpersonal skills. The burden shifting employed by the Unified 
Approach is appropriate because it is easier for the defendant, than it 
would be for the plaintiff, to show the defendant's motivation. 82 
C. Direct Evidence: The Causal Connection 
As shown above, in a mixed motives case, the causal connection 
between the gender discrimination and the employment decision needs to 
be established in order to shift the burden onto the defendant and to 
establish liability. Neither the plurality in Price Waterhouse nor the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 states that plaintiffs need "direct evidence" to prove 
the "motivating factor." On the other hand, Justice O'Connor required 
80. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 904). 
81. As Professor Mark S. Brodin has noted, "Because 'cause itself is not a fact' 
but instead 'must necessarily be an inference drawn from data furnished by the evidence,' 
it is inevitable that 'matters of policy and estimates of factual likelihood become 
hopolessly intervolved with each other.'" MarkS. Brodin, The Standard of Causation in 
the Mixed-Motive Title VII Action: A Social Policy Perspective, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 292, 
313 (1982). 
82. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 266-67 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice 
O'Connor stated that: 
I d. 
[tlhere has been a strong showing that the employer has done exactly what 
Title VII forbids, but the connection between the employer's illegitimate 
motivation and !lOY injury to the individual plaintiff is unclear. At this point 
calling upon the employer to show that despite consideration of illegitimate 
factors the individual plaintiff would not have been hired or promoted in any 
event hardly seems "unfair" or contrary to the substantive command of the 
statute. 
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"direct evidence" in her Price Waterhouse concurrence, and many courts 
have refused to employ the Price Waterhouse burden shifting because of 
the lack of "direct evidence" proffered by the plaintiff. 83 The difficulty 
with the term "direct evidence" is that it has not been clearly defined. 
Therefore, there is no one definition or threshold to be met to satisfy the 
"direct evidence" requirement. Under the Unified Approach, in which 
proof of sexual harassment by a supervisor may constitute the causal 
connection between the adverse employment decision and illegitimate 
gender-based motivation, that evidence serves as "direct evidence" in a 
disparate treatment claim. 
Justice O'Connor, in her Price Waterhouse concurring opinion, 
agreed with the plurality that the burden of persuasion should shift to the 
employer to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
same employment decision would have been made absent consideration 
of the employee's sex.84 She justified the burden shift by analogizing to 
tort liability law. Justice O'Connor stated that in a mixed motives case, 
as in multiple causation torts cases, once the plaintiff has shown that 
gender was a motivating factor, it would be impossible for the plaintiff to 
show that the defendant's consideration of her gender was the "but for" 
causation. 85 
Justice O'Connor disagreed, however, with the plurality as to what 
type of evidence the plaintiff must show in order for the burden of 
persuasion to be shifted to the defendant. The plurality said that the 
plaintiff had to show that gender was a motivating factor, and then the 
burden would shift. Justice O'Connor. said that the plaintiff must 
demonstrate "by direct evidence that an illegitimate factor played a 
substantial role in a particular employment decision. "86 
Justice O'Connor also provided a few guidelines as to what would 
constitute "direct evidence" of disparate treatment, and thereby shift the 
burden of persuasion to the defendant. She stated that: 
stray remarks in the workplace, while perhaps probative of 
sexual harassment ... cannot justify requiring the employer to 
prove that its hiring or promotion decisions were based on 
legitimate criteria. Nor can statements by nondecisionmakers 
83. See Gray v. Univ. of Arkansas, 883 F.2d 1394 (8th Cir. 1989); Danna v. 
New York Telephone Co., 752 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). See also supra notes 17-
18 and accompanying text. 
84. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 261 (o·connor, J., concurring). 
85. Id. at 263. 
86. ld. at 275 (emphasis added). 
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unrelated to the decisional process itself suffice to satisfy the 
plaintiffs burden in this regard .... 87 
Defining her threshold standard for shifting the burden of persuasion to 
the defendant, Justice O'Connor clarified that it was markedly different 
from that required by the plurality. The main difference was that 
O'Connor's standard embodied a strict causal requirement. 88 
Many federal courts use the label of "direct evidence" to describe 
the causal connection between the employment action and the 
discriminatory purpose in a mixed motives case. 89 The Eleventh 
Circuit, in Bell v. Cracldn Good Bakers, Inc.:~ considered a 
supervisor's derogatory remarks based upon a plaintiffs gender "direct 
evidence" that her supervisor's failure to promote her was because of her 
sex. Unlike Price Waterhouse, the supervisor's derogatory comments in 
Bell occurred over time and did not occur at the specific instant of 
deciding on the plaintiffs promotion. And yet the court stated "[f]or a 
person who became the supervisor over the petitioner to have said [he 
would not have women in the plant because men perform better and that 
he could get rid of her], it approaches the frivolous to contend that there 
was no direct evidence of sex discrimination. "91 Bell suggests that the 
supervisor's sexual harassment of the plaintiff constitutes "direct 
evidence" of discriminatory motive for the supervisor's adverse 
employment decision against the plaintiff, even though the harassment and 
the employment action do not occur at the same time. Thus, the Unified 
Approach should satisfy courts that require "direct evidence" to trigger 
the modified Price Waterhouse burden shifting. 
A supervisor's "severe and pervasive" sexual harassment of an 
employee coupled with the supervisor's authority to be a decision maker 
in an adverse employment decision, similar to a discriminatory 
employment policy, should constitute a causal connection between an 
adverse employment decision and gender-based motivation. The sexual 
harassment should constitute direct evidence of disparate treatment and 
trigger the modified Price Waterhouse standard of proof. Therefore, the 
87. ld. at 277. 
88. ld. at 277-78. 
89. See Chamberlin v. 101 Realty, 915 F.2d 777 (1st Cir. 1990); Sennello v. 
Reserve Life Ins. Co., 872 F.2d 393 (11th Cir. 1989); Gray v. Univ. of Arkansas, 883 
F.2d 1394 (8th Cir. 1989); Bell v. Crackin Good Bakers, Inc., 777 F.2d 1497 ('11th Cir. 
1985); Bell v. Birmingham Linen Serv., 715 F.2d 1552 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 
467 U.S. 1204 (1984); Danna v. New York Telephone Co., 752 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N. Y. 
1990); Halbrook v. Reichhold Chemicals, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
90. 777 F.2d 1497 (11th Cir. 1985). 
91. ld. at 1501. 
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three-step showing under the Unified Approach is (1) proven hostile 
environment harassment by the supervisor toward the plaintiff,92 (2) an 
adverse employment decision made against the plaintiff by the supervisor, 
and (3) the supervisor's involvement in both (1) and (2). Upon this 
three-step showing by the plaintiff, liability attaches. Then the court 
should shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant to show that, absent 
the illegitimate motive, the result would have been the same. If the 
defendant is unable to successfully meet his burden, the court should 
award damages and make whole relief to the plaintiff. 
D. 1he Unified Approach Helps Title VII Achieve Its Mandate 
According to the plurality in Price Waterhouse, the mandate of Title 
VII is to help eliminate sex discrimination in the workplace, to promote 
employment decisions based on qualifications, and to penalize those based 
on sex.93 Application of the Unified Approach would permit 
achievement of that mandate. Because liability attaches after the plaintiff 
demonstrates that sex was a motivating factor for the employment 
decision, the law proscribes a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate 
motives. The Unified Approach demonstrates the importance of attaching 
liability upon a showing of illegitimate motives, even when legitimate 
motives also were a factor, because legitimate motives often can and do 
result from the effects of illegitimate motives. 
For example, in Price Waterhouse, one of the "legitimate" factors 
cited by the employer was Hopkins' poor interpersonal skills. She was 
too aggressive and lacked "social grace. "94 In other words, the 
legitimate motives were premised on Hopkins' inability to fit the female 
stereotype. Hopkins was caught in the double bind facing many women 
in the work place: Do not act as the supervisors expect workers to a~t 
(such as being aggressive in a large accounting firm and winning big 
accounts), abide by expected female stereotypes, and lose the job; or, act 
as the supervisors expect a worker to act, do not abide by female 
stereotypes, and lose the job. As one commentator stated "[t]he Hopkins 
litigation was itself a demonstration of the influence of sex-biased 
assumptions and gendered thinking in the decisionmaking processes of 
male-dominated institutions. n9S 
92. See supra note 5. 
93. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 243 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion) (quoting 
110 CONO. REc. 7247 (1964)) .. 
94. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458,463 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev'd and 
remanded, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). · 
95. Chamallas, supra note 1, at 110 (footnote omitted). 
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The "legitimate" motivation,· therefore, that employers are able to 
present in both the McDonnell Douglas framework and the Price 
Waterhouse framework actually may be· an illusion. The Price 
Waterhouse standard, however, with the modification by the Civil Rights 
Act of 1991, accounts more adequately than the McDonnell standard for 
the illusory "legitimate" motives. Unlike the McDonnell Douglas 
framework, which allows the defendant to avoid liability by articulating 
any legitimate reason for the employment decision, the mixed motives 
standard delineated in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 allows the defendant 
to avoid payment of damages and make whole relief only upon proof that 
the same employment decision would have been made even absent the 
illegitimate motive. Therefore, proof of a "legitimate" factor in the new 
mixed motives standard will not allow the defendant to avoid liability, 
only damages. 
It is important to realize the interplay of sexual harassment and 
"legitimate" motives for adverse employment decisions. As stated earlier 
in this Comment, much research has been done on the psychological 
damage on working women as a result of sexual harassment. 96 
Consequently, in a sexual harassment claim coupled with a disparate 
treatment claim, a defendant's "legitimate" motives for the adverse 
employment decision. usually include poor job attendance or poor job 
performance. From the research, however, it is apparent that many of 
these employer's explanations result directly from the sexual harassment 
endured by the plaintiff. Therefore, it is appropriate, in accordance with 
Title VII's policy for equal employment opportunities, to prevent the 
employer from escaping liability by relying on those factors resulting 
from sex discrimination and harassment. To do so, the courts should 
employ the Unified Approach and the modified Price Waterhouse order 
of proof, not that of McDonnell Douglas. 
VII. APPLICATION OF THE UNIFIED APPROACH 
The Unified Approach tries to apply the Price Waterhouse burden 
shifting to a broader set of cases than the unique situation of Price 
Waterhouse. Rarely is a plaintiff able to obtain written thoughts of an 
employer during an employment decision making process. Therefore, to 
utilize a supervisor as the causal connection between the proven gender 
discrimination (sexual harassment) and the adverse employment decision 
allows the courts to invoke the burden shifting of Price Waterhouse and 
thereby achieve Title VII's mandate of deterring any consideration of 
gender. In this part, the Unified Approach is applied to the facts from 
96. See supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text. 
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two recent cases in which the plaintiffs brought a sexual harassment claim 
paired with a disparate treatment claim. In addition, this part describes· 
a recent district court opinion in which the Unified Approach was 
employed. 
A .. Helpful Models for Applying the Unified Approach 
In Ramsey v. City and County of Denver,91 the plaintiff resigned 
from her job as an engineer for the city alleging that she was 
discriminated against on the basis of sex. The plaintiff alleged differential 
treatment, hostile work environment sexual harassment, and constructive 
discharge because of her treatment. She offered evidence of comments, 
drawings, sexually charged physical conduct and publications found in the 
environs of the workplace as the basis of her hostile environment sexual 
harassment claim. The plaintiff presented specific evidence including the 
fact that the director of the traffic division believed that women were 
suited better for some jobs than for others. Additionally, the plaintiff 
stated that most people knew of her employer's ideas about a woman's 
place in the workforce, and he even testified to such ideas during the 
trial. 
The plaintiff's disparate treatment claim was based on her assertion 
that she was kept on probationary status rather than as a permanent 
employee, that she was inadequately supervised, that she was given 
inappropriate assignments, and that she was improperly relieved of her 
supervisory responsibilities. The city defendants stated that there was no 
discrimination, and said that the plaintiff only had her difficult personality 
to blame. 98 This is a mixed motives case because the defendant claimed 
that the employment decisions resulted from the plaintiff's difficult 
personality while the plaintiff claimed that the decisions were niade also 
because of her sex. 
Under the Unified Approach, the plaintiff first would have attempted 
to prove the existence of hostile work environment sexual harassment. 
The plaintiff would have used evidence, such as the comments, drawings, 
and sexually charged physical conduct, to show that the harassment was 
sufficiently severe and pervasive to create an abusive and hostile work 
97. 907 F.2d 1004 (lOth Cir. 1990). 
98. ln Ramsey, the district court used a Burdine framework for its analysis of the 
plaintiffs disparate ·treatment claim. Because the city effectively showed 
nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions, the district court found in favor of the city. The 
court further concluded that the plaintiff did not prove sexual harassment or constructive 
discharge. ld. at 1006-07. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit agreed that the plaintiff did not 
show that her supervisor acted on his discriminatory beliefs. ld. at 1009-10. The Tenth 
Circuit affmned the district court's decision. ld. at 1012. 
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environment. Upon a judicial finding that the plaintiff was subjected to 
sexual harassment, the plaintiff would have been required to show the 
supervisor's involvement in the sexual harassment. The plaintiff could 
have shown the supervisor's involvement through the documentation of 
either the supervisor's own active participation or his implicit condoning 
of the behavior by not stopping it once he was aware of the harassment. 
Then, the plaintiff would have been required to prove that she was 
disparately treated by the harassing supervisor. In this example, she 
would have attempted to show that she was kept on probationary status 
rather than as a permanent employee, that she was inadequately 
supervised, that she was given inappropriate assignments, and that she 
was improperly relieved of her supervisory responsibilities. 
Finally, the plaintiff would have been required to demonstrate the 
causal connection: that the employment decisions were caused by the 
supervisor's discriminatory motives. The plaintiff would have 
accomplished this offer of proof through the evidence that the supervisor 
who had sexually harassed her and allowed others to sexually harass her 
was the same supervisor who had made the various employment decisions 
against her. 
If the plaintiff had satisfied all three steps outlined above, under the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, liability would have attached. The significance 
of the finding of liability is the recognition that any consideration of 
illegitimate motives in employment decisions is in violation of Title VII. 
As in all mixed motives cases, the court next would have employed the 
Price Waterhouse framework and shifted the burden to the defendant to 
show that, absent the illegitimate motive, he still would have kept the 
employee on probationary status. If the defendant had been successful in 
carrying his burden of proof and convinced the court that, even absent 
consideration of the plaintiffs gender, the plaintiffs difficult personality 
was enough to cause him to keep her on probationary status, then the 
defendant would not have been responsible for the payment of damages 
and make whole relief. If the defendant had been unsuccessful in 
carrying his burden of proof, however, the court would have ordered him 
to pay damages and make whole relief. 
In order to further illustrate the implementation of the Unified 
Approach, the follo~ing discussion uses facts from Danna v. New York 
Telephone Co. 99 In Danna, the plaintiff brought suit against her 
employer alleging that she was subjected to hostile work environment 
sexual harassment and .that she was discharged and demoted because of 
sex discrimination in violation of Title VII. Danna provided evidence that 
she was subjected to unwelcome sexual. harassment in the form of sexually 
99. 752 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
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explicit and offensive graffiti. Even though Danna's supervisors were 
aware of the graffiti, they did not try to stop it or remove it. 
Consequently, the graffiti remained on the walls for over two years. 100 
The plaintiff's evidence included statements by her supervisor. For 
example, her supervisor told another of Danna's supervisor's that "they 
[were] looking to get rid of [Danna] ... because she was a pain in 
the ... ass. " 101 Danna's supervisor also told her that if she acted more 
"feminine [and] cutesy," others would be more willing to help her with 
her work. 102 Another time, one of her supervisors told another 
supervisor to write a complaint about Danna, and stated that "'one way 
or another' he would get [the] 'bitch. '"103 . 
Under the Unified Approach, the plaintiff first would have been 
required to prove that she was subjected to hostile work environment 
sexual harassment. As stated in Vinson, the plaintiff would have been 
required to establish that the unwelcome sexual harassment was severe 
and pervasive enough to cause an offensive and abusive working 
environment. Second, the plaintiff would have attempted to show that she 
was demoted and discharged by the supervisor. Third, the causal 
connection between the gender discrimination and the employment 
decision would have been established through the supervisor's 
involvement in both the sexual harassment and the disparate treatment. 
Once the court had found that she had been sexually harassed, the 
plaintiff would have shown that the supervisor discriminated against her 
because of her sex through the sexual harassment. 
Application of the Unified Approach would have prevented Danna's 
employer from escaping liability for his illegitimate motives by pointing 
to Danna's poor job attendance as the legitimate reason for demoting and 
discharging her. As noted earlier, research suggests that it is possible that 
100. ld. at 610. After applying the Henson test, the Danna court held that the 
plaintiff had been subjected to a hostile work environment. Additionally, the court held 
that the harassment was severe enough tO result in employer liability. ld. For the 
allocation of the burdens of proof the court utilized the Burdine, rather than the Price 
Waterhouse, framework. The court reasoned that the facts offered by Danna were not 
direct evidence that the defendant used gender-based criteria in the plaintifrs demotion 
or discharge, and therefore applied the Burdine standard of proof. ld. at 613 n.6. The 
court stated that even though the defendants offered legitimate reasons for the demotion 
of Danna, the plaintiff had offered evidence showing that the reason for the demotion was 
pretextual. Concerning the discharge claim, Danna was unable to persuade the court that 
the employer's "legitimate" reasons for demoting her-because she violated the handbook 
rules-were pretextual. The court also stated that the sexual harassment was not related 
to the causes of her demotion. 
101. Id. at 598. 
102. ld. at 614. 
103. ld. 
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Danna's job attendance declined because she was subjected to so much 
sexual harassment on the job. Thus, the employer's illegitimate conduct 
provided the employer with "legitimate reasons" for discharging her. 104 
B. Unified Approach Applied 
A district court, in Halbrook v. Reichhold Chemicals, tos has 
applied the Unified Approach and the Price Waterhouse standard of 
proof. In Halbrook, the court denied the defendant's motion for summary 
judgment on both the plaintifrs claim of discriminatory failure to promote 
and her claim of constructive discharge. 106 
The plaintiff alleged that she was subjected to sexual harassment. 
She claimed that "she was warned [by management] not to let women's 
issues 'get in the way'; harassed about whether or not she would return 
to Reichhold after her maternity leave; told to read a book about women's 
supposed fear of success; and ridiculed when she requested an 
appointment to an administrative committee. "107 The Halbrook court 
found that the sexual harassment evidence provided direct evidence of a 
discriminatory failure to promote her, and employed the Price Waterhouse 
standard of proof. 108 The decision in Halbrook, therefore, is a good 
example of how the Unified Approach should operate because the court 
broadened the causal nexus between gender-based motivation and the 
adverse employment decision in order to include supervisory or 
management's prior sexual harassment. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
In Price Waterhouse, a plurality of the Supreme Court adopted an 
order of proof that shifted the burden of persuasion to the defendant. The 
decision held that in mixed motives cases the plaintiff must demonstrate 
104. The eourt, in considering her demotion claim, considered the facts toward the 
demotion "against a background which consists of Danna being subjected to a hostile 
environment .... " Danna, 752 F. Supp. at 615. Danna won on that claim. ld. The 
court did not find for Danna on the discharge claim because she eould not establish the 
prima facie case required by Burdine. She could not show that a similarly situated male 
was not dismissed for the reasons she was dismissed, such as long coffee breaks and 
falsifying work records. ld. at 615-16. 
105. 735 F. Supp. 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
106. ld. at 123-24. 
107. ld. at 125. 
108. The court stated that "where a plaintiff provides direct evidence of 
discriminatory motive, the burden shifts to the employer to show that it would have made 
the same decision absent such a motive." Jd. at 125 (quoting Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 
at 241-42). 
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that gender played a motivating role in an adverse employment decision. 
The employer defendant then may avoid liability by proving that he would 
have made the same decision absent the discriminatory motivating factor. 
The Civil Rights Act of of 1991 modified the order of proof by attaching 
liability after the plaintiff demonstrated that gender was a motivating 
factor in the adverse employment decision. 
The Unified Approach applies the modified Price Waterhouse 
framework to cases in· which the . plaintiff couples a sexual harassment 
claim and a disparate treatment claim. Because of the policy for 
nondiscriminatory and desegregated work environments embodied in Title 
VII, and because of the documented harm resulting from sexual 
harassment, courts should allow the burden to shift to the defendant if the 
plaintiff demonstrates that her supervisor sexually harassed her, or 
condoned the harassment, and that the harassing supervisor made an 
employment decision that was . adverse to her. 
